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FI
NG
S THE MOTHER 
OF INTERVENTION
A fte r unconscion­
able foot-dragging, a 
litany of hollow 
threats and half­
hearted, poorly 
executed aid 
m easures, the time 
has finally come for 
full-scale, 
international military 
intervention in 
form er Yugoslavia.
There is, sadly, no 
other alternative that 
now remains to halt 
the barbarism 
enveloping the 
Balkans.
T
he mere presence of United 
Nations forces in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina hasn’t fazed the 
Bosnian Serb aggressors or their mas­
ters in Belgrade. Neither rival armies 
nor Serbia’s domestic opposition pos­
sess the resources to stop the Serb 
regime’s drive for territorial conquest. 
A quick, decisive invasion of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina—on the scale of Opera­
tion Desert Storm—is the last real 
option available to the international 
community, and one that the Left 
should rally around with all of its 
energy.
On simple humanitarian grounds, 
military intervention could put the 
quickest possible end to the bloodbath 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The six- 
month old war has already claimed 
over 100,000 lives and turned at least 
2.5 million Bosnians into refugees. 
Every report about the savagery loose 
in the former republic seems more 
inconceivable than the last. No longer 
can foreign observers feign ignorance 
about the war’s carnage and the bes­
tial crimes of its combatants, about 
the concentration camps and the mas­
sacres, about the rape and torture.
The international community’s 
condemnation of Serbian aggression, 
as well as the meagre UN humanitar­
ian rescue aid for the beleagured peo­
ple of Bosnia, has proved to be much 
too little, much too late. If the Ser­
bian siege of Bosnian cities and the 
‘ethnic cleansing’ of non-Serb com­
munities continues into the winter— 
which it will—the body count is ex­
pected to soarto two or three hundred 
thousand.
That suffering, however, is only a 
taste of what is to come should inter­
national inaction give in to the de­
signs of Serbia’s nationalist hench­
men. In a larger context, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina represents a test case for 
nationalist expansionism in Europe, 
on the one hand, and for post-Cold 
War Europe’s commitment to a new 
democratic order, on the other.
So far, the territorial war of the 
Serbian militants in Bosnia has made 
a mockery of every principle that un­
derpins the notion of a democratic 
European House. The Serb leadership 
in rump Yugoslavia has defiantly 
thumbed its nose at international pro­
tests, warnings and sanctions, break­
ing every promise that UN negotia­
tors have extracted from them.
Yet their intransigence is paying 
off. The Serbs, who make up only 
32% of the mixed Bosnian popula­
tion, now control 70% of its territory. 
The Croats (17% of the population) 
call the shots in nearly a quarter of the 
former republic. Serb and Croat lead­
ers agreed a year ago that when the 
killing is over, the 43% Muslim popu­
lation will have but a few tiny land­
locked enclaves to themselves. Should 
Serbia and Croatia simply walk away 
scot-free from a partitioned Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Europe might as well 
toss the 1990 Conference for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 
Treaty—the foundation of a united,
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democratic Europe—into the dust­
bin. The capitulation would send a 
clear message to extremist regimes 
across eastern Europe that might 
makes right, and that the rest of Eu­
rope will look on without lifting a 
finger.
After Bosnia the Serbs appear in­
tent upon taking their Greater Ser­
bian blueprint into Kosovo and Mac­
edonia. In Kosovo, Serbia’s southern 
province, the Serb military is tighten­
ing the already tight screws on the 
ethnic Albanian majority there. Serb 
president Slobodan Milosevic, who 
made his name as a communist by 
stripping Kosovo of its provincial au­
tonomy, is obviously spoiling for a 
fight that would enable him to ho­
mogenise Kosovo as well. The spectre 
of a Kosovo ‘cleansed’ of its almost 
two million ethnic Albanians is night­
marish enough. But any such dramatic 
escalation of tensions would also cer­
tainly bring Albania proper into the 
picture which, one way or another, 
will come to the defence of its Kosovar 
brothers.
Serb nationalists have also set their 
sights on Macedonia, formerly Yugo­
slavia’s southernmost republic and 
now an independent state. The fact 
that Milosevic and his radical sup­
porters consider Macedonia to be 
‘south Serbia’ sits well with neither its 
Macedonian nor ethnic Albanian in­
habitants, much less with neighbour­
ing Greece, Albania and Bulgaria, all 
of whom have claims on the diminu­
tive Balkan plot. A Serbian offensive 
in either Kosovo or Macedonia would 
almost certainly ignite a full-scale 
Balkan war, dragging in Turkey and 
parts of the Islamic world too.
The debate over military inter­
vention has bitterly split the Left in 
Germany as throughout western Eu­
rope. Critics argue that alternatives 
such as harder, strictly enforced sanc­
tions have yet to be exhausted. The 
German Greens insist that domestic 
sources of opposition such as the vari­
ous democratic parties or the peace 
movements, desperately need west­
ern support. They call for yet another 
conference to bring the warring par­
ties together for negotiations.
The fact is, however, that these 
options haven’t the remotest hope of
stopping the slaughter underway now. 
Tighter sanctions must be applied, 
and to Croatia as well as Serbia. (Like­
wise, the arms moratorium against all 
of Bosnia should exclude the Bosnian 
army.) A military intervention must 
also work closely with all democratic 
forces throughout former Yugoslavia, 
though particularly with those from 
Serbia. Once Milosevic and his friends 
fall from power, the Serbian opposi­
tion will hold the key to a lasting 
Balkan peace. But at present these 
forces on their own are no match for 
the nationalist strongmen.
Left opponents of intervention 
also point to the legacy of western 
military intervention over past dec­
ades, from Vietnam to the Persian 
Gulf. But in the case of former Yugo­
slavia, the standard grounds for ‘impe­
rialist’ intervention, such as empire 
and markets, simply don’t apply in the 
same way. On the contrary, their ab­
sence explains exactly why there 
hasn’t been more forceful interven­
tion to date.
The applicable precedent for in­
tervention in former Yugoslavia is 
neither Vietnam nor the Gulf War, 
but World War Two when the allies 
(also belatedly) joined forces to de­
feat Nazi Germany. In Serbia, Europe 
confronts an expansionist, national 
socialist regime once again, complete 
with concentration camps and geno- 
cidal policies. The Croats, make no 
mistake, have it in them to be just as 
ruthless. Europe’s present policy of 
appeasement could well cost it the 
vision of a peaceful, democratic Eu­
rope that flickered so briefly with the 
end of the Cold War.
Europe’s interests in the Balkans 
are European stability and stemming 
the flow of refugees. The demise of the 
Cold War, while leaving the US the 
unchallenged superpower, also opened 
the way for independent UN and joint 
European foreign policy initiatives. 
The west European leaderships should 
have taken the lead long ago in former 
Yugoslavia. But in light of their bicker­
ing and the UN’s ineffectual inter­
ventions. I would have no qualms 
about the US orNATO stepping in, if 
that’s what it takes.
Military intervention, however, 
must have specific goals and a solid
commitment to laying the founda­
tions for a viable, democratic postwar 
order. The first goal of intervention 
must be to end the war in Bosnia and 
to restore and secure the sovereign 
borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina under 
aprotectorate. The Bosnian Serb mili­
tants, as well as their Croat counter­
parts, must be fully disarmed, and de­
militarised zones established in Bosnia 
and othercontested regions. All those 
responsible for war crimes, from poli­
ticians and generals to footsoldiers 
involved in the pillage and plunder, 
should be tried before an international 
court and sentenced. Kosovo and 
Macedonia should also be placed un­
der the umbrella of the UN and new 
elections called in every former re­
public.
It is a well-propagated myth that 
the peoples of former Yugoslavia can­
not live together. Every day in the 
bunkers of Sarajevo, Serb, Croat and 
Muslim citizens lock arms with their 
neighbours. They sing and share their 
last bits of food and live together as 
they have for the last 40 years. The 
war informer Yugoslavia is not apopu- 
lar, ethnic conflict, but a territorial 
war manipulated from the halls of 
power and waged by extremists.
Either as a loose confederation or 
even as independent states, the peo­
ples of the Balkans could coexist peace­
fully again. Those states, however, 
must be civic states, based upon equal­
ity under citizenship, and not upon 
superiority according to nationality. 
They must constitutionally guarantee 
minority rights, the rights of regional 
and ethnic autonomy and the integ­
rity of borders. It would be the respon­
sibility of the international commu­
nity to closely monitor the respect of 
those rights, taking swift, punitive 
action against violations.
Decisive international action six 
months ago could have prevented the 
war in Bosnia. Once the conflict spills 
over into neighbouring states, the west 
will find itself drawn into the Balkan 
melee anyhow. The longer full-scale 
intervention is postponed, the more 
costly and complex it will become. ■
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